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NOTES
THE STATE RESPONSES TO KIRBY v. UNITED STATES
I. IN'RODUCTION
The enlargement of the sixth amendment right to counsel" played an
important role in the expansion of the due process rights of accused
persons during the 1960's.2 The Supreme Court has found that the right
to counsel is a fundamental right, applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment,3 in all criminal cases in which the accused faces
possible incarceration. The sixth amendment right to counsel need not
be requested,5 and can only be waived knowingly and intelligently. 6 In
1967, the Supreme Court made the right to counsel applicable to federal
and state pretrial corporeal identification procedures," but in 1972, the
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defence."
2. It is generally accepted that the expansion of the constitutional rights of the
accused from 1961 to 1972 was of revolutionary proportion. See Rivers v. United States,
400 F.2d 935, 939 (5th Cir. 1968); Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and Ash: Do Any Constitu-
tional Safeguards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MICH. L.
REv. 717, 719 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Grano]; Note, Police Coercion of Witnesses,
1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 865; 2 AM. J. CRim. 98, 107 (1973).
A wide range of rights, formerly available only to defendants in federal courts, was
extended during the 1960's to defendants in state prosecutions. Benton v. Maryland, 395
US. 784 (1969) (ban against double jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) (sixth amendment right to jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)
(tight to compulsory process); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to
speedy trial); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right to counsel during
custodial interrogations); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment right
to confrontation); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment applied to
states); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (standards governing federal searches and
seizures also govern states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth amendment
exclusionary rule applied to states).
3. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4. In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), Justice Douglas rejected the
argument that the right to counsel is inapplicable to crimes punishable by less than six
months imprisonment.
5. Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945). See also Kitchins v. Smith, 401
U.S. 847 (1971); Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949).
6. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938). A waiver cannot be made knowingly and intelligently unless it is made with full
awareness of the consequences. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
7. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (right to counsel at post indictment
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expansion of the right to counsel in the identification context ceased,
when in Kirby v. Illinois" the Court restricted the right to counsel to
identification procedures occurring after the initiation of formal judicial
proceedings against the accused.
The purpose of this Note is to determine the current status of the right
to counsel at state identification procedures, and to evaluate the treat-
ment given Kirby by the state courts. This Note will also examine the
general basis of the right to counsel, the development of the right to
counsel in the context of corporeal identification procedures, and alter-
natives to Kirby which the states might adopt.
I1. THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. The Special Circumstances Analysis
The Supreme Court first applied the right to counsel to state cases
under a general due process analysis, rather than by formulating and
applying a precise sixth amendment test.'" In 1932, in Powell v. Ala-
bama," the Court held that "ignorant and illiterate' 1 2 defendants had a
lineups applicable to the states); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (right to
counsel applicable to postindictment lineups). For a discussion of the Wade-Gilbert rule,
see notes 36-45 infra and accompanying text.
There are two kinds of corporeal identification procedures-lineups and showups. In a
lineup, a group of persons including the suspect is viewed by a witness or witnesses who
are asked to identify the offender. P. WALL, EYE-WrrNESS IDENTnIICATION IN CRIMINAL
CAsEs 27-28 (1965) [hereinafter cited as WALL]. In a showup, a lone suspect is
presented to a witness or witnesses for the purpose of identifying him as the offender. Id.
at 40-41. The showup procedure hints at the suspect's guilt by the very nature of the
confrontation. Young, Due Process Consideration in Police Showup Practices, 6 CIUM.
L. BULL. 373, 377-78 (1970). Although the Supreme Court has noted that the use of
showups "has been widely condemned," Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967)
(footnote omitted), the Court rejected the argument that showups are per se inadmissible
in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), holding that showup identification procedures
are permissible so long as identification is reliable in "the totality of the circumstances."
Id. at 199.
8. 406 U.S. 682 (1972). See notes 48-55 infra and accompanying text. Many
commentators have viewed Kirby as a severe limitation upon the accused's sixth
amendment rights. See, e.g., Note, The Pre-Trial Right to Counsel, 26 STAN. L. REv. 399,
418 (1974); 2 AM. J. Crim. L. 98, 107 (1973); 4 LOYOLA U. (of Chicago) L.J. 213, 226
(1973).
9. The due process clause that was applied to the states in Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932), see notes 11-15 infra and accompanying text, was, of course, that found
in the fourteenth amendment.
10. Grano 742.
11. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
12. Id. at 52. The defendants in Powell were seven black youths. They were
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"fundamental right" to counsel. 13 Since the accused "required the guid-
ing hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings,"14 due process
mandated the extension of the right to counsel to the period between the
time of arraignment and the time of trial."
In Betts v. Brady,'6 however, the Court held that the Powell prece-
dent applied only to special circumstances in which the accused was
intellectually incapable of defending himself.'1 Betts refused to incorpo-
rate the sixth amendment into the fourteenth amendment due process
clause, reasoning that the representation of counsel was not essential to a
fair trial.' 8
strangers to the Alabama community in which they were charged with raping two white
girls. Id. 50-51.
13. Id. at 68.
14. Id. at 69.
15. Id. at 57. The Court explained that:
[Diuring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings . . . from the
time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consultation,
thorough going investigation and preparation were vitally important, the de-
fendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were
as much entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial itself.
Id. at 57, citing People ex rel. Burgess v. Risley, 66 How. Pr. 67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1883)
and Batchelor v. State, 189 Ind. 69, 76, 125 N.E. 773, 776 (1920).
However, the Court in Powell deemed it unnecessary to fashion a broad holding,
stating:
All that is necessary now to decide . . . is that in a capital case, where the
defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making
his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like,
it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him
as a necessary requisite of due process of law ....
287 U.S. at 71.
16. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the state
court's denial of Betts' writ of habeas corpus, 315 U.S. 791 (1942). Justice Roberts,
writing for the majority, characterized the case:
[P]etitioner was indicted for robbery. . . . Due to lack of funds, he was
unable to employ counsel, and so informed the judge at his arraignment. He
requested that counsel be appointed for him. The judge [refused], as it was
not the practice ...to appoint counsel for the indigent defendants, save in
prosecutions for murder and rape.
316 U.S. at 456-57.
17. Betts conducted his own defense, a simple alibi. He elected to have a bench trial,
cross-examined adverse witnesses, and called favorable witnesses. He was found guilty
and sentenced to eight years. Id. at 457. Justice Roberts concluded that:
mhe accused was not helpless, but was a man forty-three years old, of or-
dinary intelligence, and ability [sic] to take care of his own interests on the
trial of that narrow issue.
Id. at 472.
18. Id. at 471, 473. Justice Roberts listed the state constitutional and statutory
provisions regarding the right to counsel, in addition to state case law. Id. at 467-71 &
nn.20-30. It is interesting to note that Justice Roberts interpreted the Federal Constitu-
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B. The Critical Stage Test
In 1961, in Hamilton v. Alabama,'0 the Supreme Court rejected the
Betts approach sub silentio,20 and held that the right to counsel attached
at any "critical stage" in a criminal proceeding. 2' Gideon v. Wain-
wright22 expressly overruled BettsY3 and established the right to counsel
in all serious state criminal proceedings. The Court has since used the
critical stage test to extend Gideon to all state criminal proceedings,
whether serious or petty.24
Having determined that the right to counsel turns upon whether a
particular procedural stage is "critical," the Court established that sen-
tencing,25 and the first appeal granted as a matter of right20 are critical
tion according to a state majority rule approach.
In a number of post-Betts cases, however, the Supreme Court found special circum-
stances requiring the appointment of counsel. In Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55
(1951), for example, the Supreme Court again asserted that the right to counsel was not
mandatory in state noncapital cases unless the absence of counsel would deny the
accused "the essentials of justice" Id. at 64 (footnote omitted). See McNeal v. Culver,
365 U.S. 109 (1961) (right to counsel for uneducated, mentally ill, indigent defendant);
Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951) (right to counsel for mentally ill defendant);
Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948) (right to counsel for eighteen year old); Grano 743
& n.154; Note, supra note 8, at 399 n.2.
19. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
20. The only language concerning the capabilities of the defendant in Justice
Douglas's opinion in Hamilton was a statement that "[o]nly the presence of counsel
could have enabled this accused to know all the defenses available to him and to plead
intelligently." Id. at 55. The opinion made no reference to any intellectual, psychological,
or educational handicap of the defendant.
21. Id. at 53-54. The Court held that, in Alabama, arraignment is a critical stage
requiring counsel. Justice Douglas stated:
Whatever may be the function and importance of arraignment in other juris-
dictions, we have said enough to show that in Alabama it is a critical stage
in a criminal proceeding. . . . Available defenses may be as irretrievably lost,
if not then and there asserted, as they are when an accused represented by
counsel waives a right for strategic purposes.
Id. at 54 (footnote omitted). For a conceptual analysis of the critical stage test as a
functional analysis expanding upon a stage-of-proceeding "chronological baseline," see
Note, supra note 8, at 401-03.
22. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
23. Id. at 339.
24. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
25. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
26. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Douglas relied upon the equal
protection reasoning of an earlier decision, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). In
Griffin, the Court held that if state law conditions appeal upon the availability of a
stenographic trial transcript, the equal protection clause demands that the state make
transcripts available to indigent defendants. The plurality opinion asserted: "There can
be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss2/5
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post-trial stages requiring appointment of counsel. Similarly, the Court
has held arraignments,2 7 preliminary hearings, 28 and in-custody interro-
gations29 to be critical pretrial stages.
In Escobedo v. Illinois,30 the Court applied the "critical stage" test to
interrogation at a police station,"1 and held that the right to counsel
attached upon request when an "investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect. '8 2 Although the right to counsel now attaches at in-custody
interrogations as a matter of right,3 the Escobedo accusatory-focus
analysis is still significant in the application of the critical-stage test to
pretrial procedures.34
he has." Id. at 19. Douglas applied the "equal justice" analysis of Griffin to invalidate
the California procedure of refusing to appoint an appellate attorney for an indigent if
the appellate court reviewed the record and determined that "no good whatever could be
served" by the appointment. 372 U.S. at 354-55.
27. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); see notes 19-21 supra.
28. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
29. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964), the Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment prohibits extraction of
incriminating statements, in the absence of counsel, from an indicted person who is not
in custody. A law enforcement agent had wired for sound the automobile of Massiah's
codefendant, who then engaged in an incriminating conversation with Massiah. The post-
indictment Massiah rule has been made applicable to the states. McLeod v. Ohio, 381
U.S. 356 (1965) (per curiam). But see Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966);
notes 65-66 infra.
30. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
31. Id. at 479.
32. Id. at 490-91.
33. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
34. The Miranda Court may have intended to limit the Escobedo accusatory-focus
analysis by using the term "in-custody" interrogation and stating: 'This is what we
meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investigation which had focused on an accused."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 n.4 (1966). Several state courts have recently
applied Escobedo accusatory-focus rationale in identification cases. E.g., People v. Lowe,
- Colo. -, 519 P.2d 344 (1974); Godbee v. State, 232 Ga. 259, 206 S.E.2d 432
(1974); State v. Northup, - Me. -, 303 A.2d 1 (1973); State v. Easthope, 29 Utah 2d
400, 510 P.2d 933 (1973).
The use of the critical-stage test as the theoretical basis for determining the right to
counsel was firmly established by 1963. The Court had applied the critical-stage test in
White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
and Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). By 1965, the majority of state courts
recognized that the critical-stage test was the most important factor in applying the right
to counsel. Tucker v. State, 42 Ala. App. 174, 157 So. 2d 229 (1963); State v. Alford, 98
Ariz. 124, 402 P.2d 551 (1965); People v. White, 233 Cal. App. 2d 765, 43 Cal. Rptr.
905 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965); State v. Morrocco, 2 Conn. Cir. 568, 203 A.2d 161 (App.
Div. 1964); Harris v. State, 162 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 1964); Freeman v. State, 87 Idaho 170,
392 P.2d 542 (1964); People v. Morris, 30 Ill. 2d 406, 197 N.E.2d 433 (1964); State v.
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1"1. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT CORPOREAL
IDENTIFICATION PROCEEDINGS
A. The Federal Standards
In 1967, United States v. Wade 5 extended the right to counsel to
include pretrial identification procedures in federal cases.8 6 Justice Bren-
Young, 194 Kan. 242, 398 P.2d 584 (1965); Carson v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.2d 85
(Ky. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 938 (1965); Johnson v. State, 238 Md. 140, 207 A.2d
643 (1965); Commonwealth v. O'Leary, 347 Mass. 387, 198 N.E.2d 403 (1964); State v.
Owens, 391 S.W.2d 248 (Mo. 1965); Rainsberger v. State, 81 Nev. 92, 399 P.2d 129
(1965); State v. Lanzo, 44 N.J. 560, 210 A.2d 613 (1965); Sanders v. Cox, 74 N.M.
524, 395 P.2d 353, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965); People v. Combs, 19 App. Div. 2d
639, 241 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1963); McLean v. Maxwell, 2 Ohio St. 2d 226, 208 N.E.2d 139
(1965); State v. Neely, 239 Ore. 487, 398 P.2d 482 (1965); Commonwealth v. Patrick,
416 Pa. 437, 206 A.2d 295 (1965); Moorer v. State, 244 S.C. 102, 135 S.E. 2d 713, cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 860 (1964); Cooper v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 883, 140 S.E.2d 688
(1965); Pettit v. Rhay, 62 Wash. 2d 515, 383 P.2d 889 (1963); Sparkman v. State, 27
Wis. 2d 92, 133 N.W.2d 776 (1965).
35. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). Prior to Wade, courts considered corporeal identification
procedures merely investigatory stages and therefore not requiring the presence of
counsel under the accusatory-focus analysis of Escobedo. Caldwell v. United States, 338
F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 984 (1965); see Anonymous v. Baker,
360 U.S. 287 (1959); In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957); United States v. Curry, 354
F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873 (1966).
36. In Wade, the police put the defendant in a lineup with five or six other prisoners
in a local county courtroom. Each participant in the lineup was required to wear strips
of tape similar to those allegedly worn by the robber during the crime. In addition, each
participant, upon direction, stated "put the money in the bag," words allegedly spoken by
the robber. Two bank employees identified Wade. 388 U.S. at 220. The Court held that
compelling Wade to appear in the lineup, speak, and wear the tape did not violate his
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
The Court relied upon Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) to find that
Wades participation in the lineup did not produce testimonial evidence, and therefore
was not within the fifth amendment proscription. 388 U.S. at 221. Schrnerber established
that nontestimonial evidence (blood samples) may be taken from an accused without
violating his fifth amendment rights. Wade clarified the investigatory powers of law
enforcement officials in its holding that a suspect may constitutionally be required to
wear items or speak during identification procedures. Id. at 221-22. In Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), the Court upheld the constitutionality of requiring a
suspect to produce handwriting exemplars. UNiFoRm RULE OF EVIDEMNCE 25 provides in
part:
(b) no person has the privilege to refuse to submit to examination for the pur-
pose of discovering or recording his corporeal features and other identify-
ing characteristics. . . and
(c) no person has the privilege to refuse to furnish or permit the taking of
samples of body fluids or substances for analysis ....
A proposed federal rule of criminal procedure would permit law enforcement authorities
to use nontestimonial identification procedures upon less-than-probable cause. Proposed
Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 41.1(c) (2,3), 52 F.R.D. 409,
463 (1971). The proposed rule defines nontestimonial identification as including:
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nan reasoned that the inherent dangers of eyewitness identification in
the pretrial context37 compelled the decision and stated:
The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals
of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification ....
"[t]he influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses
probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single
factor-perhaps it is responsible for more such errors than all other
factors combined."3 8
The Court noted that when counsel is absent at the identification stage,
the defense can seldom accurately reconstruct the lineup at trial,39 and
identification by fingerprints, palm prints, footprints, measurements, blood
specimens, urine specimens, saliva samples, hair samples, or other reasonable
physical or medical examination, handwriting exemplars, voice samples, photo-
graphs, and lineups.
Id., rule 41.1(1) (3), 52 F.R.D. 409, 466-67 (1971). The Supreme Court has hinted that
nontestimonial identification procedures upon less-than-probable cause might be permis-
sible. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969):
Detentions for the sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints are . . subject to
the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. It is arguable, however, that...
such detentions might. . . be found to comply with the Fourth Amendment
even though there is no probable cause . . . . Detention for fingerprinting
may constitute a much less serious intrusion upon personal security than other
types of police searches and detentions.
Although the fifth amendment does not protect the accused from nontestimonial
identification procedures, those procedures must, nonetheless, be reasonable to avoid
violating the fourteenth amendment due process provision. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352
U.S. 432 (1967); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
37. 388 U.S. at 235. One commentator has stated: "It is an article of faith within
the legal profession that eyewitness testimony is unreliable." Pulaski, Neil v. Biggers:
The Supreme Court Dismantles the Wade Trilogy's Due Process Protection, 26 STAN. L.
Rv. 1097, 1097 n.1 (1974), citing N. SOBEL, EYE-WrrNEsS IDENTICATION 5-12
(1972); McGowan, Constitutional Interpretation and Criminal Identification, 12 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 235, 238-39 (1970). The distorting influence of a sudden brief encounter
with a total stranger, engaged in an often violent criminal act, upon a witness' perception
and recollection of the event is well documented. Pulaski, supra at 1097; Levine & Tapp,
The Psychology of Criminal Identification, 121 U. PA. L. Rav. 1079, 1097-1100 (1973).
See WALL 19-23. See also Grano 749, citing Doob & Kirshenbaum, Bias in Police
Lineups-Partial Remembering, 1 J. POLICE Sct. & ADmI. 287 (1973) (description of a
Canadian empirical study of misidentification by eyewitnesses describing a suspect).
For a thorough analysis of the legal and scientific problems with eyewitness identifica-
tion, see People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 205 N.W.2d 461 (1973).
38. 388 U.S. at 228-29, quoting WALL 26.
39. 388 U.S. at 230. Justice Brennan pointed out:
Improper influences may go undetected by a suspect, guilty or not, who expe-
riences the emotional tension which we might expect in one being confronted
with potential accusers. Even when he does observe abuse, if he has a criminal
record he may be reluctant to take the stand ... [A]ny protestations by
the suspect of the fairness of the lineup . . . are likely to be in vain; the jury's
Vol. 1975:423] 429
Washington University Open Scholarship
430 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
that an identifying witness who has selected the defendant at the lineup
is unlikely to "go back on his word" at trial.40
Although the Court clearly based its decision upon the right to
counsel, the right in pretrial identification procedures is inextricably tied
to the sixth amendment right to confrontation. Justice Brennan asserted
that, because the accused is unable to challenge effectively at trial any
unfairness in a pretrial identification procedure, denial of counsel at the
pretrial stage of the proceedings deprives the accused of
his only opportunity meaningfully to attack the credibility of the wit-
ness' courtroom identification.
Insofar as the accused's conviction may rest on a courtroom iden-
tification . ..which the accused is helpless to subject to effective
scrutiny at trial, the accused is deprived of that right of cross-examina-
tion which is an essential safeguard to his right to confront the witnesses
against him.41
Although the lineup in Wade occurred after the accused had been
indicted,42 the Court did not expressly limit its holding to postindict-
ment procedures, stating that precedent "requires that we scrutinize any
pretrial confrontation."4  In a companion decision, Gilbert v.
California,44 the holding of Wade was applied to the states.4 After the
choice is between the accused's unsupported version and that of the police offi-
cers present.
Id. at 230-31 (footnotes omitted).
40. Id. at 229.
41. Id. at 232, 235.
42. Id. at 219.
43. Id. at 227 (emphasis original). In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967),
decided the same day as Wade, the Court declined to apply Wade retroactively.
44. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
45. The Court applied a prophylactic rule and stated:
Only a per se exclusionary rule as to such [identification] testimony can be
an effective sanction to assure that law enforcement authorities will respect the
accused's constitutional right to the presence of his counsel at the critical
lineup.
Id. at 273. The Wade-Gilbert rule is not without limitation, however. An accused
generally may waive his right to counsel. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); Von
Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The
specific right to counsel at a pretrial corporeal identification may be waived, provided the
waiver is voluntary and knowingly and intelligently made. See, e.g., Taylor v. Swenson,
458 F.2d 593, 596-97 (8th Cir. 1972); Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 98, 175 N.W.2d
625, 628 (1970).
In addition, the right to counsel often is inapplicable to on-the-scene confrontations
occurring shortly after the offense, because of exigent circumstances. United States v.
Perry, 449 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Wilson, 435 F.2d 403 (D.C.
[Vol. 1975:423
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Wade decision most of the circuit courts construed the case broadly and
held the right to counsel applicable to preindictment confrontations.48
In 1972, however, the Supreme Court in Kirby v. Illinois restricted
the right to counsel to those identification procedures occurring after the
initiation of "adversary judicial criminal proceedings." 47 In a plurality
opinion, 48 which turned upon a technical construction of the term
Cir. 1970); United States v. Sanchez, 422 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1970); Russell v. United
States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928 (1969). State courts have
recognized this on-the-scene exception. See, e.g., State v. Salcido, 109 Ariz. 380, 509 P.2d
1027 (1973); Brand v. Wofford, 230 Ga. 750, 199 S.E.2d 231 (1973); State v. Smith,
261 La. 608, 260 So.2d 641 (1972).
If a witness' Wade-tainted identification testimony is erroneously admitted at trial, the
conviction is not automatically reversed upon appeal. If the prosecution can establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of the testimony was harmless, the
conviction will stand. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242 (1967); see Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); FED. R. CIuM. P. 52(b).
In addition, if a witness' recognition of the accused is from a source independent of
that of a Wade-tainted corporeal identification, such as an adequate opportunity to
observe the offender during the crime, the witness' in-court identification of the accused
is permissible. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967). See Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (independent source rule and photographic identifications).
In a legislative attempt to overrule Wade, Congress passed Title II of the Omnibus
Safe Streets and Crime Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3502 (1970):
The testimony of a witness that he saw the accused commit or participate
in the commission of the crime for which the accused is being tried shall be
admissible in evidence in a criminal prosecution in any trial court ordained and
established under article HI of the Constitution of the United States.
This provision has not yet been challenged, although in Read, Lawyers at Lineups:
Constitutional Necessity or Avoidable Extravagance?, 17 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 339, 359-60
(1969), the author viewed the Act as a clearly unconstitutional legislative attempt to
overrule a constitutional interpretation by the Supreme Court. See also Burt, Miranda
and Title 1I: A Morganatic Marrage, 1969 Sup. CT. Rav. 81, 123-25.
46. See, e.g., Wilson v. Gaffney, 454 F.2d 142 (10th Cir. 1972); Virgin Islands v.
Callwood, 440 F.2d 1206 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Greene, 429 F.2d 193 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Cooper v. Picard, 428 F.2d 1351 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Phillips,
427 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Ayers, 426 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1970);
United States v. Broadhead, 413 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1969); Rivers v. United States, 400
F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1968). In Wilson v. Gaffney, supra at 144, the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit stated:
In both Wade and Gilbert the lineups were conducted after indictments ...
[here,] the lineup occurred before petitioner had been formally charged. But
surely the assistance of counsel ...does not arise or attach because of the
return of an indictment . . . . Every reason set forth by the Supreme Court
in Wade . . . for the assistance of counsel post-indictment has equal or more
impact when projected against a pro-indictment atmosphere.
47. 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). Kirby was identified in a showup. Id. at 684. See note
7 supra.
48. Justice Stewart announced the judgment of the Court in an opinion in which
Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Blackman and Rehnquist joined. Justice Powell, in a
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"criminal prosecution" in the sixth amendment,4 9 Justice Stewart stated
that the right arose with
the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by
way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment.
. . . It is this point . . . that marks the commencement of the
"criminal prosecutions" to which alone the explicit guarantees of the
Sixth Amendment are applicable. 50
The plurality rejected Kirby's argument that establishing a fixed stage at
which the right to counsel attached exalted form over substance, 1 and
stated:
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere
formalism. It is the starting point of our whole system of adversary
criminal justice. For it is only then that the government has committed
itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government
and defendant have solidified.52
concurring opinion, merely stated, "As I would not extend the Wade-Gilbert per se
exclusionary rule, I concur in the result reached by the Court." Id. at 691. Justices
Douglas and Marshall joined in Justice Brennan's dissent, while Justice White dissented
separately, stating only that Wade and Gilbert "govern this case and compel reversal of
the judgment" denying the right to counsel. Id. at 705.
49. See note 1 supra.
50. 406 U.S. at 689-90 (footnote omitted). In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice
Burger stated:
I agree that the right to counsel attaches as soon as criminal charges are
formally made against an accused and he becomes the subject of a "criminal
prosecution."
Id. at 691. In joining in the technical construction of the sixth amendment term
"criminal prosecution," the Chief Justice was entirely consistent with his construction of
the term in his dissenting opinion in Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 21 (1970), in
which he stated:
If the Constitution provided that counsel be furnished for every "critical
event in the progress of a criminal case," that would be another story, but it
does not. In contrast to the variety of verbal combinations employed by the
majority to justify today's disposition, the Sixth Amendment states with laud-
able precision that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have
the Assistance of Counsel." (Emphasis added). The only relevant determina-
tion is whether a preliminary hearing is a "criminal prosecution," not whether
it is a "critical event in the progress of a criminal case."
Id. at 23 (emphasis original).
51. Defendant's brief, quoting Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486 (1964), ar-
gued that "[lt would exalt form over substance to make the right to counsel ... depend
on whether at the time of the interrogation, the authorities had secured a formal indict-
ment." Brief for Petitioner at 12, Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). See notes 30-32,
34 supra and accompanying text.
52. 406 U.S. at 689.
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To establish the initiation of formal proceedings as the point at which
the right to counsel attached, Justice Stewart found it necessary to
distinguish Escobedo, which had applied an accusatory-focus analysis
under the critical stage test.53 Justice Stewart reasoned that Escobedo
was essentially a fifth amendment rather than a right to counsel case 54
and that the Court had limited the Escobedo holding to its facts.55 Thus,
the Wade-Gilbert rule, extending the right to counsel to pretrial corpo-
real identification procedures, and the Kirby decision, precluding that
right in preformal charge procedures, established a clear federal stan-
dard to be applied in corporeal identification cases.
B. Kirby v. Illinois: Constitutional and Practical Analysis
One pre-Kirby commentator suggested that the right to counsel at
pretrial corporeal identification proceedings is a mere extravagance. 56
Analysis suggests, however, that the right to counsel at all in-custody
corporeal identification proceedings is a practical necessity and the logi-
cal conclusion of the pre-Kirby cases.57
In establishing a right to counsel at corporeal identification proce-
dures, Justice Brennan's opinion in Wade recognized that the "inherent
53. Id. at 689. See notes 30-32, 34 supra and accompanying text.
54. 406 U.S. at 689.
55. Id., citing Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). See note 67 infra.
56. See Read, supra note 45, at 367. Professor Read felt that local police regulations
would be more useful than the presence of counsel, and discussed several representative
regulations. Id. at 396-402. See also Murray, The Criminal Lineup at Home and Abroad,
1966 UTAH L. REv. 610, 627-28 (proposed model statute); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Official Draft No. 1, July 15, 1972).
In People v. Fowler, I Cal. 3d 335, 461 P.2d 643 (1969), 82 Cal. Rptr. 363, a pre-
Kirby case, the California Supreme Court held that Oakland Police Department Regula-
tions did not, despite their imposition of procedural safeguards, eliminate the reasons for
considering lineups as a critical stage of the criminal process. The court stated:
Even if we assume for purposes of argument that these regulations provide
substantive standards which if followed would insure a fair lineup, the United
States Supreme Court has made it clear that a constitutionally adequate substi-
tute for the presence of counsel at the lineup, in order to preserve a meaningful
confrontation at trial, must provide for a means whereby the defendant can
have an opportunity at trial to effectively reconstruct the procedure by which
he was identified in a pre-trial lineup. [Citing Wade.] The regulations in
question do not provide such a means.
Id. at 348, 461 P.2d at 653, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 373 (emphasis original).
57. See Sobel, Assailing the Impermissible Suggestion: Evolving Limitations on the
Abuse of Pre-Trial Criminal Identification Methods, 38 BROOKLYN L. REv. 261, 274-75
(1971).
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dangers"58 in the "vagaries of eyewitness identification" are a leading
cause of injustice.5 9 Although the defendant in Wade had been identi-
fied in a postindictment lineup,60 the Court emphasized that it would
"scrutinize any pre-trial confrontation.""' In Stovall v. Denno,02 decided
the same day as Wade, the Court held that Wade did not apply retroac-
tively to a defendant identified in a preindictment showup, but there was
no implication that the preindictment factual setting of the case was of
any signficance to the decision. Thus Kirby, in limiting the right to
counsel to lineups taking place after the bringing of formal charges,
varied from the Wade-Gilbert rationale.
Kirby further deviated from precedent by applying a rigid distinc-
tion between preindictment and postindictment cases in the sixth
amendment context. Arguably, Massiah v. United States', and Hoffa v.
United States64 established such a distinction.65 But the preindictment,
postindictment dichotomy represented by the Massiah and Hoffa deci-
sions was consistent with the Escobedo accusatory-focus analysis" and
is distinguishable from the formalistic approach taken in Kirby. 7
58. 388 U.S. at 235.
59. Id. at 228-29.
60. Id. at 219.
61. Id. at 227 (emphasis original).
62. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
63. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
64. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
65. In Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), the Supreme Court held that
an indicted person's right to counsel was denied when law enforcement agents elicited
incriminating statements from him during a conversation with an informer overheard by
the agents by means of an eavesdropping device. In Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966), the Court rejected a similar sixth amendment argument from a person who was
merely under investigation. Although the cases arguably distinguish the preindictment
and postindictment phases, another distinction seems more persuasive. See note 66 infra.
66. In Massiah, the defendant had been indicted, i.e., accusations had focused upon
him, see note 65 supra. In Hoffa, however, the investigation had not yet focused upon
the defendant. 385 U.S. at 309-310. Since Escobedo held that the right to counsel
attaches only after accusation has focused upon an individual, the cases are simply
consistent with Escobedo and should not be construed as having established a rigid
distinction between preindictment and postindictment time periods.
67. The use of the Escobedo accusatory-focus analysis to distinguish Massiah and
Hoffa from Kirby should not be criticized because of Kirby's treatment of Escobedo.
Although Kirby distinguished Escobedo on two grounds, see text accompanying notes 54-
55 supra, it did so incorrectly. Note, The Pretrial Right to Counsel, 26 STAN. L. Rav.
399, 411-12 (1974); 2 AM. J. Cium. L. 98, 105 (1973). First, in stating that Escobedo
was a fifth amendment rather than a sixth amendment case, the Court in Kirby linked
Escobedo to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which expanded the right to
counsel to in-custody interrogation in order to protect the accused's fifth amendment
rights and thus encompassed the Escobedo holding, which established the right to counselhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss2/5
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Although Kirby attempted to distinguish Escobedo, it effectively
avoided the crucial sixth amendment constitutional basis upon which the
Court had decided Wade: that the right to counsel at corporeal identifi-
cation proceedings is necessary to protect the right "meaningfully" to
confront identifying witnesses at trial.6 Because the formalistic Kirby
approach restricts the right to counsel to identification proceedings
taking place after the filing of formal charges, and because without
counsel present at the lineup the defense cannot accurately reconstruct
the event at trial, 69 Kirby fails to protect the right to confrontation of an
accused identified in a preformal charge proceeding.
The logical conclusion of the pre-Kirby cases-Wade, Gilbert, and
Stovall, building upon the Escobedo accusatory-focus framework-is
that the right to counsel should extend to any pretrial corporeal identifi-
cation confrontation. 70 Kirby, although it retained the right to counsel in
at such interrogation only upon the request of the accused, see text accompanying note
32 supra. The Kirby decision's limited construction of Escobedo might have been
appropriate if Wade had not favorably cited Escobedo for the proposition that a pre-
arraignment right to counsel does exist. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 225
(1967). Second, notwithstanding Kirby, Escobedo is currently regarded as a valid sixth
amendment precedent by both federal, see note 2 supra, and state courts, see notes 85 &
86 infra and accompanying text.
Justice Stewart's opinion in Kirby further distinguished Escobedo by asserting that
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), had limited Escobedo to its facts. In
Johnson, however, the Court did no more than refuse to apply Escobedo retroactively.
384 U.S. at 732. Moreover, in Miranda, decided one week prior to Johnson, the Court
stated that "[wle have undertaken a thorough reexamination of the Escobedo decision
and the principles it announced, and we reaffirm it." 384 U.S. at 442.
68. See notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text.
69. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
70. A "floodgates" argument could be made that if the right to counsel is extended
to all pretrial identification procedures, it must also be extended to searches and seizures.
Since Eicobedo and Miranda extended the right to counsel to pretrial in-custody interro-
gations, and Wade, citing Escobedo, extended sixth amendment rights to pretrial identifi-
cation procedures, it could be argued that if a criminal investigation has focused on the
accused he would have a right to counsel in the search and seizure context. At least one
state court, however, has rejected that contention. McGowan v. State, - Ind. App. -,
296 N.E.2d 667 (1973). More important, the fourth amendment, through its warrant
and probable cause requirements, offers sufficient protection to suspects subjected to
search. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
The Supreme Court has expressed a strong preference for searches made under warrant.
See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965). Only under exigent circum-
stances will the Court permit searches made without a warrant. Ker v. California, 374
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the postformal charge context, 71 offers only an illusory protection to the
accused. Under Kirby, the police can avoid the requirements of Wade
simply by delaying the filing of formal charges until the suspect has
been viewed in a lineup. 72 Because of the great danger of misidentifica-
tion at any identification proceeding,73 the extension of the right to
counsel to all pretrial corporeal identification proceedings is a practical
necessity under our system of justice.
C. The State Responses to Wade and Kirby
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Kirby, at least thirteen states
construed Wade broadly and established a preindietment, preinforma-
tion right to counsel at state corporeal identification proceedings. 74 Five
U.S. 23 (1963). Furthermore, the specificity required in a search warrant permits no
exercise of discretion on the part of law enforcement officials executing the warrant.
Marion v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). Only a disinterested magistrate, rather
than a law enforcement official, can issue a search warrant. Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971). Thus, in a search under a warrant, a suspect has far greater
protection from police abuses than he does in an identification procedure.
Since searches may be conducted without warrants only in exigent circumstances, such
as a search incident to arrest, Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), searches
without warrant protection occur only in situations in which sixth amendment protection
would be equally impracticable.
71. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972).
72. In People v. Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d 335, 344, 461 P.2d 643, 650, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363,
370 (1969) (emphasis original), the California Supreme Court stated:
[W]e think it clear that the establishment of formal accusation as the time
wherein the right to counsel at lineup attaches could only lead to a situation
wherein substantially all lineups would be conducted prior to indictment or in-
formation. We cannot reasonably suppose that the high court, recognizing that
the same dangers of abuse and misidentification exist in all lineups, would an-
nounce a rule so susceptible of emasculation by avoidance.
See Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d 351, 361 (1974) (Eagen, J.,
concurring). However, after the Kirby decision, California restricted the right to counsel
to lineups taking place after formal charges have been filed. See People v. Chojnacky, 8
Cal. 3d 759, 505 P.2d 530, 106 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1973).
73. See notes 37-38 supra and accompanying text.
74. People v. Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d 335, 461 P.2d 643, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363, (1969); State
v. Singleton, 253 La. 18, 215 So. 2d 838 (1968); Commonwealth v. Guillory, 356 Mass.
591, 254 N.E.2d 427 (1970); Palmer v. State, 5 Md. App. 691, 249 A.2d 482 (1969);
People v. Hutton, 21 Mich. App. 312, 175 N.W.2d 860 (1970); Thompson v. State, 85
Nev. 134, 451 P.2d 704, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 893 (1969); State v. Wright, 274 N.C. 84,
161 S.E.2d 581 (1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 934 (1969); State v. Isaacs, 24 Ohio App.
2d 115, 265 N.E.2d 327 (1970); Commonwealth v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 738,
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 919 (1970); In re Holley, 107 R.I. 615, 268 A.2d 723 (1970);
Martinez v. State, 437 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); State v. Hicks, 76 Wash. 2d
80, 455 P.2d 943 (1969); Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970).
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states, however, foreshadowed Kirby and refused to apply the right until
an indictment or information had been filed.75 Of the states faced with
the sixth amendment issue since the decision in Kirby, a substantial
majority has restricted its application to corporeal identification proceed-
ings occurring after the filing of formal charges.7 6 Relying upon Kirby,
75. State v. Fields, 104 Ariz. 486, 455 P.2d 964 (1969); Perkins v. State, 228 So. 2d
832 (Fla. 1969); People v. Palmer, 41 Ill. 2d 571, 244 N.E.2d 173 (1969); State v.
Walters, 457 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1970); Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 664, 173
S.E.2d 792 (1970).
76. Cole v. State, 52 Ala. App. 447, 293 So. 2d 871 (1974); Giles v. State, 52 Ala.
App. 106, 289 So. 2d 673 (1974); Houston v. State, 49 Ala. App. 403, 272 So. 2d 610
(1973); Sims v. State, 51 Ala. App. 183, 283 So. 2d 635 (1973); State v. Taylor, 109
Ariz. 518, 514 P.2d 439 (1973); State v. Flynn, 109 Ariz. 545, 514 P.2d 466 (1973);
State v. Rodriquez, 110 Ariz. 57, 514 P.2d 1245 (1973); State v. Money, 110 Ariz. 18,
514 P.2d 1014 (1973); State v. Salcido, 109 Ariz. 380, 509 P.2d 1027 (1973); State v.
Delvecchio, 109 Ariz. 35, 504 P.2d 936 (1972); State v. Branch, 108 Ariz. 351, 498 P.2d
218 (1972); Crawford v. State, 254 Ark. 253, 492 S.W.2d 900 (1973); People v.
Chojnacky, 8 Cal. 3d 759, 505 P.2d 530 (1973), 106 Cal. Rptr. 106; People v. O'Roy, 29
Cal. App. 3d 656, 105 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1973); People v. Faulkner, 28 Cal. App. 3d 384,
104 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1972); Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1974); Ashford v. State,
274 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1973); Chancy v. State, 267 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1972); Hunt v.
Hopper, 232 Ga. 53, 205 S.E.2d 303 (1974); Brand v. Wofford, 230 Ga. 750, 199 S.E.2d
231 (1973); Mitchell v. Smith, 229 Ga. 781, 194 S.E.2d 414 (1972); Hudson v. State,
229 Ga. 565, 193 S.E.2d 7 (1972); West v. State, 229 Ga. 427, 192 S.E.2d 163 (1972);
State v. Sadler, 95 Idaho 524, 511 P.2d 806 (1973); State v. Grierson, 95 Idaho 155, 504
P.2d 1204 (1972); People v. Johnson, 55 IMI. 2d 62, 302 N.E.2d 20 (1973); People v.
Mueller, 54 Ill. 2d 189, 295 N.E.2d 705, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1044 (1973); People v.
Reese, 54 Ill. 2d 51, 294 N.E.2d 288 (1973); People v. Burbank, 53 Il. 2d 261, 291
N.E.2d 161 (1972); People v. Patrick, 53 IIl. 2d 201, 290 N.E.2d 227 (1972); Daniels v.
State, - Ind. App. -, 312 N.E.2d 890 (1974); Auer v. State, - Ind. App. -, 289
N.E.2d 321 (1972); Williamson v. State, 201 N.W.2d 490 (Iowa 1972); State v. Jackson,
199 N.W.2d 102 (Iowa 1972); State v. Oskey, 213 Kan. 564, 517 P.2d 141 (1973); State
v. Jackson. 212 Kan. 473, 510 P.2d 1219 (1973); State v. Daniel, - La. -, 297 So. 2d
417 (1974), af!'d sub nom. Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31 (1975); State v. Rowe, 314
A.2d 407 (Me. 1974); State v. Emery, 304 A.2d 908 (Me. 1973); State v. Northup, 303
A.2d I (Me. 1973); State v. Boyd, 294 A.2d 459 (Me. 1972); Foster v. State, 272 Md.
273, 323 A.2d 419 (1974) (dictum); Jackson v. State, 17 Md. App. 167, 300 A.2d 430
(1973); Booth v. State, 16 Md. App. 524, 298 A.2d 478 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Stanley, - Mass. -, 292 N.E.2d 694 (1973); Commonwealth v. Kudish, - Mass. -,
289 N.E.2d 856 (1972); Commonwealth v. Lopes, - Mass. -, 287 N.E.2d 118 (1972);
State v. Carey, 296 Minn. 214, 207 N.W.2d 529 (1973); Hobson v. State, 285 So. 2d 464
(Miss. 1973); Allen v. State, 274 So. 2d 136 (Miss. 1973); Chandler v. State, 272 So. 2d
641 (Miss. 1973); State v. Richardson, 495 S.W.2d 435 (Mo. 1973); State v. Jenkins,
494 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. 1973); Arnold v. State, 484 S.W.2d 248 (Mo. 1972); State v.
Jordan, 506 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); State v. Gray, 503 S.W.2d 457 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1973); State v. Tidwell, 500 S.W.2d 329 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Shields v. State, 491
S.W.2d 6 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Reed v. Warden, 89 Nev. 141, 508 P.2d 2 (1973); Baker
v. State, 88 Nev. 369, 498 P.2d 1310 (1972); Spencer v. State, 88 Nev. 392, 498 P.2d
1335 (1972); People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 320 N.E.2d 625, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881
Washington University Open Scholarship
438 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1975:423
thirteen of these states have restricted the right to counsel without
discussing the merits of the issue. 7  Four of these states had previously
held that the right to counsel attached at corporeal identification pro-
ceedings even when they occurred before the filing of formal charges.7 8
Although Kirby expressly stated that the right to counsel at corporeal
identification proceedings attached only after "the initiation of adversary
judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge, pre-
liminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment," 7 one state
purporting to apply the Kirby rationale extended the sixth amendment
to all lineups held after arrest. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court deter-
mined that "adversary judicial criminal proceedings" were initiated at
arrest. The court justified its conclusion by reasoning that the Kirby
(1974); People v. Parrish, 70 Misc. 2d 577, 333 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Nassau Co. Ct. 1972);
State v. Tingler, 31 Ohio St. 2d 100, 285 N.E.2d 710 (1972); State v. Sheardon, 31 Ohio
St. 2d 20, 285 N.E.2d 335 (1972); Stewart v. State, 509 P.2d 1402 (Okla. Crim. App.
1973); Chandler v. State, 501 P.2d 512 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972); State v. McLeod, 260
S.C. 445, 196 S.E.2d 645 (1973); Nichols v. State, 511 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Crim. App.
1974); Lane v. State, 506 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Ward v. State, 505
S.W.2d 832 (Tex. App. 1974); Evans v. State, 499 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. App. 1973); Yancy
v. State, 491 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. App. 1973); Ellingsworth v. State, 487 S.W.2d 108 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1972); Turner v. State, 486 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Jones v.
State, 63 Wis. 2d 97, 216 N.W.2d 224 (1974); State v. Russell, 60 Wis. 2d 712, 211
N.W.2d 637 (1973); Laster v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 525, 211 N.W.2d 13 (1973); State v.
Taylor, 60Wis. 2d 506, 210 N.W.2d 873 (1973).
77. Giles v. State, 52 Ala. App. 106, 289 So. 2d 673 (1974); Lynch v. State, 293 So.
2d 44 (Fla. 1974); State v. Grierson, 95 Idaho 155, 504 P.2d 1204 (1972); Auer v.
State, - Ind. App. -, 289 N.E.2d 321 (1972); State v. Jackson, 199 N.W.2d 102 (Iowa
1972); State v. Jackson, 212 Kan. 473, 510 P.2d 1219 (1973); State v. Edgecombe, 275
So. 2d 740 (La. 1973); Commonwealth v. Lopes, - Mass. -, 287 N.E.2d 118 (1972);
State v. Carey, 296 Minn. 214, 207 N.W.2d 529 (1973); Chandler v. State, 272 So. 2d
641 (Miss. 1973); State v. Sheardon, 31 Ohio St. 2d 20, 285 N.E.2d 335 (1972); State v.
McLeod, 260 S.C. 445, 196 S.E.2d 645 (1973); Turner v. State, 486 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1972).
The author does not mean to imply that these state courts did not consider the merits
of the issue in formulating the state rules. Rather, the lack of reasoning in the opinions is
noted to illustrate the impact of the Kirby precedent, as a federal standard, upon the
states. Indeed, in People v. O'Roy, 29 Cal. App. 3d 656, 105 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1973), a
California court considered the right to counsel issue on its merits, and, stating that it
was bound by the Kirby ruling, overruled several well-reasoned pre-Kirby decisions.
78. Compare State v. Singleton, 253 La. 18, 215 So. 2d 838 (1968), Commonwealth
v. Guillory, 356 Mass. 591, 254 N.E.2d 427 (1970), State v. Isaacs, 24 Ohio App. 2d
115, 265 N.E.2d 327 (1970), and Martinez v. State, 437 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Crim. App.
1969), with State v. Edgecombe, - La. -, 275 So. 2d 740 (1973), Commonwealth v.
Lopes, - Mass. -, 287 N.E.2d 118 (1972), State v. Sheardon, 31 Ohio St. 2d 20, 285
N.E.2d 335 (1972), Turner v. State, 486 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
79. 406 U.S. at 689; see note 50 supra.
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language did not establish "an all inclusive rule" but left the line-
drawing to the states.Y In a plurality opinion,8 the court stated, "We
are convinced that it would be artificial to attach conclusionary signifi-
cance to the indictment in Pennsylvania." 2 One other state court has
indicated in dictum that, even after Kirby, the right to counsel attaches
at arrest.83
Although Kirby expressly rejected Escobedo,8 4 four states have ap-
plied the accusatory-focus analysis. Even so, those states have held that
Kirby limited the right to counsel to corporeal confrontations occurring
after formal charges have been filed. z For example, the Maine Supreme
Court interpreted Kirby as holding that "the Sixth Amendment right to
80. Commonwealth v. Richman, - Pa. -, 320 A.2d 351, 353 (1974).
81. Justice Nix wrote the plurality opinion, joined by two other justices. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Eagen, joined by one other justice, asserted that Kirby was
not amenable to the broad interpretation imposed upon it by the plurality. Justice Eagen,
however, rejected Kirby on policy grounds, stating:
The artificial distinction drawn by the plurality in Kirby, between post-charge
and pre-charge lineups is unwise and infringes upon the protections society
should grant an accused. To force an accused to stand alone against the full
force and investigative powers of organized society, until he is actually charged
with the commission of the crime, is an outrageous injustice. The accused's
liberty is equally jeopardized by a pre-charge lineup, as it is by a post-charge
lineup. Thus, I consider the line as laid down in Kirby to be arbitrary and
unfounded. To follow the constitutional mandate of Kirby would be to en-
courage the law-enforcement personnel of this Commonwealth to hastily con-
duct all lineups prior to the institution of the "adversary judicial criminal pro-
ceedings". . . . Thus, it is my strong feeling that the superior procedure is
to grant the right to counsel at all lineups subsequent to arrest ....
Id. at 361.
82. Id. at 353.
83. In State v. Henderson, 285 N.C. 1, 203 S.E.2d 10 (1974), the North Carolina
Supreme Court construed N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-451(b) (2) (1972). Prior to the Kirby
decision, the section had been construed as establishing a right to counsel at all lineups
held after arrest. State v. Bass, 280 N.C. 435, 186 S.E.2d 384 (1972). Although the
Henderson court asserted that Kirby narrowed prior interpretations of the provision, it
applied the accusatory-focus analysis and reasoned that, since the warrant had not been
served upon the defendant until after the shownp, the right to counsel did not apply to
that investigatory stage. 285 N.C. at 11, 203 S.E.2d at 17.
84. See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra. Jackson v. State, 17 Md. App. 167,
174 n.4, 300 A.2d 430, 435 n.4, cert. denied, 268 Md. 749 (1973), stated:
[ilt is patent in Kirby that an "adversary judicial proceeding" is not attained
merely by the focusing of an investigation on an accused. . .. The focusing
of an investigation on an accused invokes the right to counsel with respect to
self-incrimination but not with respect to pre-trial confrontations.
85. People v. Lowe, - Colo. -, 519 P.2d 344 (1974) (en bane); West v. State,
229 Ga. 427, 192 S.E.2d 163 (1972); State v. Rowe, 314 A.2d 407 (Me. 1974); State v.
Easthope, 29 Utah 2d 400, 510 P.2d 933 (1973).
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counsel [does] not apply to a police-arranged investigatory confronta-
tion."86
Several states, although following the majority view, have questioned
Kirby on policy grounds.8 7 A Missouri court stated:
,[If Wade ... [and] Gilber ... have any validity for the reasons
designated therein... ,then on principle the same reasons should obtain
and carry over, absent exigent circumstances, to a lineup conducted
after arrest especially when the investigation has focused upon the ar-
restee as suspect. Once he has been identified by the victim, preinforma-
tional or post-informational, to a large extent he has had his trial. While
I recognize society's need for early detection of criminal activities, I
fail to see in what significant way its societal needs are abridged by
permitting the accused, absent exigent circumstances, -o have counsel
present at this critical juncture.""
Of the states that have reconsidered the policies underlying the Kirby
decision, only one has rejected Kirby outright. The Michigan Supreme
Court, after an extensive analysis of the danger of misidentification at
any identification proceeding,8 9 continued, despite the Kirby decision, 90
to apply the broad pretrial right to counsel established after Wade.0'
86. State v. Rowe, 314 A.2d 407, 412 (Me. 1974) (emphasis added).
87. State v. Gray, 503 S.W.2d 457, 460 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Chandler v. State, 501
P.2d 512, 519-20 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972); State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 522, 210
N.W.2d 873, 882 (1973).
88. State v. Gray, 503 S.W.2d 457, 460 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). Similarly, the
Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals, in Chandler v. State, 501 P.2d 512, 520 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1972), stated:
[We strongly feel that better procedures require that before a line-up is con-
ducted, the suspect be given the right to contact an attorney of his choice, or
be informed that one will be called if he is unable to hire one, for in this sug-
gestion, lies the ultimate safeguard against the abuses which Stovall and Foster
attempt to negate.
Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 442 (1969), rendered inadmissible a witness' testi-
mony about his identification of a suspect in an unduly suggestive corporeal identifica-
tion proceeding. Whether such a proceeding is unnecessarily suggestive depends upon
the "totality of the circumstances." Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). But
see the discussion of the independent source rule, note 45 supra.
In State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 210 N.W.2d 873, 882 (1973), the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin asserted that although Kirby would be applied in Wisconsin, "we neverthe-
less believe it is good police practice and in the interest of justice to afford such counsel
(at all pretrial lineups] where practicable."
89. People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 338, 217 N.W.2d 22, 27 (1974), relied upon
People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 205 N.W.2d 461 (1973), a photographic identifica-
tion case, in which the Michigan Supreme Court thoroughly discussed the legal and
scientific problems that eyewitness identifications present.
90. People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 217 N.W.2d 22 (1974); People v. Dates, 52
Mich. App. 544, 546, 218 N.W.2d 100, 101 (1974).
91. For a discussion of the application of the Wade, Gilbert, Stovall trilogy, see
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss2/5
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Although Michigan is unlikely to extend the right to counsel to precus-
tody corporeal identifications,9 2 it has firmly established a right to coun-
sel upon arrest.93
IV. POSSIBLE STATE ALTERNATIVES TO Kirby
The most obvious alternative available to the states is to refuse to
follow the Kirby decision. In protecting the right of accused persons,
states may adopt higher standards than those required by the Supreme
Court." State courts could review the policy grounds upon which the
Court decided Kirby and find that:
The artificial distinction drawn by the plurality in Kirby, between post-
charge and pre-charge lineups is unwise and infringes upon the pro-
tections society should grant an accused. To force an accused to stand
alone against the full force and investigative powers of organized society,
until he is actually charged... is an outrageous injustice .... WJ-t is a
meaningless distinction to postpone the granting of the right to counsel
at lineups until the "official" initiation of the judicial criminal process. 95
Following the lead of Michigan, states could thus establish a broad post-
arrest right to counsel at identification confrontations. 6 In addition, the
People v. Hutton, 21 Mich. App. 312, 320-24, 175 N.W.2d 860, 864-66 (1970).
92. In People v. Lee, 391 Mich. 618, 218 N.W.2d 655 (1974), the Michigan
Supreme Court refused to extend the right to counsel to precustody photographic
identification procedures. In view of the court's reliance upon People v. Anderson, 389
Mich. 155, 205 N.W.2d 461 (1973), a photographic identification case, in establishing
the postarrest right to counsel, see note 89 supra, Michigan is unlikely to create a
precustody right to counsel at corporeal identification procedures.
93. People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 217 N.W.2d 22 (1974); People v. Dates, 52
Mich. App. 544, 218 N.W.2d 100 (1974).
94. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967). Several states, for example, have
extended fifth amendment protection to nontestimonial evidence. E.g., Aldrich v. State,
220 Ga. 132, 137 S.E.2d 463 (1964) (refusal of truck driver to drive truck on weight
scales within fifth amendment protection); Allen v. State, 183 Md. 603, 39 A.2d 820
(1944) (fifth amendment justifies suspect's refusal to try on hat found at scene of
crime); Davis v. State, 131 Ala. 10, 31 So. 569 (1902) (comment on defendant's refusal
to permit his shoe to be compared to footprint at scene of crime violates fifth
amendment). But see note 36 supra.
95. Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, -, 320 A.2d 351, 361 (1974) (Eagen,
J., concurring). See People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 217 N.W.2d 22 (1974), citing
People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 205 N.W.2d 461 (1973) (pre-trial right to counsel
at photographic identifications); cases cited note 87 supra.
96. See notes 89, 91 & 93 supra and accompanying text. Compare People v. Jackson,
391 Mich. 323, 338-39, 217 N.W.2d 22, 27 (1974) (right to counsel at corporeal and
photographic identifications before or after filing of formal charges, "independent of any
federal constitutional mandate"), with People v. Lee, 391 Mich. 618, 625, 218 N.W.2d
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Escobedo accusatory-focus analysis could provide a conceptual frame-
work for the extension of the sixth amendment to suspects who have not
yet been arrested, but who are nonetheless the focus of criminal investi-
gations. At least one state adopted this approach prior to Kirby,9 7 and
several states, although they recognize no right to counsel in preindict-
ment confrontations, recognize the validity of the accusatory-focus anal-
ysis despite Kirby's rejection of Escobedo.98
With the exception of Michigan, the states have demonstrated an
unwillingness to reject Kirby outright. It is possible, however, to estab-
lish a postarrest right to counsel without refuting Kirby. As the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court9 9 reasoned, the Kirby limitation upon the sixth
amendment-"the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings
-whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information, or arraignment"'°0 ---may be viewed as a less-than-inclu-
sive rule, leaving individual state procedure to determine when criminal
proceedings begin. Since adversary judicial proceedings may begin at
arrest, that could be the point at which the right to counsel attaches
under Kirby.10 This construction of Kirby, however, is not readily
655, 658 (1974) (no right to counsel at pre-arrest photographic identification proce-
dure).
97. In State v. Anderson, 117 N.J. Super. 507, 515-16, 285 A.2d 234, 238 (1971), a
New Jersey appellate court found the right to counsel applicable to a preformal charge
showup because the police had already focused upon the accused and therefore had gone
beyond the investigatory stage of the proceedings. See State v. Gilliam, 83 N.M. 325, 491
P.2d 1080 (Ct. App. 1971) (dictum). A Maryland court, however, noted that the
Escobedo accusatory-focus analysis is inconsistent with the Kirby rationale. Jackson v.
State, 17 Md. App. 167, 174 n.4, 300 A.2d 430, 435 n.4 (1973). See note 89 supra.
98. See sources cited notes 85 & 86 supra and accompanying text.
99. Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d 351 (1974). The court
stated:
Kirby only instructs us to limit [the Wade] rule where the limitation would
benefit the interest of society in the prompt and purposeful investigation of an
unsolved crime. In light of Pennsylvania's procedure, we find no countervail-
ing benefit where the lineup occurs after arrest.
Id. at -, 320 A.2d at 353.
Apparently, Missouri has also interpreted Kirby as leaving to state procedure the
determination of what constitutes the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings. In
Arnold v. State, 484 S.W.2d 248 (Mo. 1972), the Missouri Supreme Court relied upon
early Missouri precedent to establish that the first step in the institution of a formal
criminal charge under state procedure is the filing of a complaint. The court held that
the right to counsel under Kirby attaches at that stage of the proceedings.
100. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. at 682, 689 (1972).
101. Justice Eagen, concurring in Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d
351 (1974), felt that Justice Nix had applied a strained construction of Kirby and stated:
It is clear in my mind that the [Kirby] plurality used the . . . terms [formal
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss2/5
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available to the large number of states that have already determined
that Kirby applies upon the filing of formal charges." °2
One other prophylactic approach could be applied consistent with the
Kirby rationale. The McNabb-Mallory rule'03 provides that after arrest,
an accused must be brought before a magistrate for arraignment "with-
out unnecessary delay.' 0 4 Since Kirby expressly stated that arraignment
is a point at which the right to counsel attaches,' 0 5 the McNabb-Mallory
rule, if applicable in the identification context, offers substantial protec-
tion to the sixth amendment rights of an accused.' 06 Although the
Supreme Court adopted the McNabb-Mallory rule primarily to avoid
lengthy police interrogation resulting in coerced confessions, 0 7 several
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information and arraignment] as syno-
nyms. . . . Jurisdictions vary on the terminology they employ to refer to the
time when the accused is formally charged and when their adversary proceed-
ings initiate; and thus the reason for including the five different terms ...
Thus, I believe it is ludicrous to say that under the Kirby test we can draw the
Wade-Gilbert line at arrest.
Id. at -, 320 A.2d at 359 (footnote omitted).
Justice Eagen then rejected Kirby on policy grounds, see note 107 infra and accompany-
ing text.
102. See cases cited note 76 supra.
103. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1943).
104. Although McNabb established the right of the accused to be presented promptly
to a magistrate for arraignment, Mallory, which upheld FED. R. Cram. P. 5(a), is a more
applicable precedent in federal cases. FED. R. CRM. P. 5(a) provides:
An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any
person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person with-
out unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner or before any
other nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses
against the laws of the United States. When a person arrested without a war-
rant is brought before a commissioner or other officer, a complaint shall be
filed forthwith ....
Congress, by Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. 1 3501(c) (1970), attempted to abolish the McNabb-Mallory rule. The constitu-
tionality of this provision has been questioned. See also note 45 supra.
105. See text accompanying note 100 supra. For a persuasive argument that a
criminal prosecution begins at arraignment, see Grano 788-89, quoting F. MILLER,
toscmoN: THE DEaSION TO CHARGE A SusP'cr wrM A CRIME 14 (1969).
106. Although the McNabb-Mallory rule is only a federal standard and therefore not
binding upon the states, almost every jurisdiction has adopted the rule. Grano 786. For a
list of the state provisions, see AMEmCAN LAW INsTlrrn, A MODEL CoDE oF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT Paocmanutn, App. I(c) (Official Draft No. 1, July 15, 1972). Although the
McNabb-Mallory rule may have been abolished by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (1970), the section is arguably unconstitutional, see
note 45 supra, and, even if it were constitutional, it would not prevent state adoption of
procedures similar to the McNabb-Mallory rule. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58
(1967).
107. The police arrested Mallory in mid-afternoon and subjected him to interrogation.Washington University Open Scholarship
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post-Wade decisions applied the rule to exclude trial testimony about
corporeal identifications that took place prior to arraignment.108 Chief
Justice Burger, then judge of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, decribed the effect of Wade upon the application of the Mc-
Nabb-Mallory rule as follows:
[T]he reason for not [previously] applying Mallory to a lineup identifica-
tion was that a lineup in the absence of counsel before Wade was a
perfectly legitimate procedure... and that Mallory was concerned with
improper "interrogation." It was natural for the cases following Mallory
to concentrate on the exclusion of utterances, but not other forms of
evidence. But Wade has changed this. Now that the right to counsel is
an integral part of the lineup procedure, the warnings that are given
at presentment and the opportunity to have counsel appointed are
highly relevant to the lineup situation.... Since the Mallory rule was
a response to the -protections afforded by prompt presentment, it is
appropriately applied to the line-up situation in the wake of Wade.'0 9
Although the Court in Mallory stated that the rule "does not call for
mechanical or automatic obedience,"''10 the delay in arraignment must
not result from taking a suspect to the police station in order to obtain
evidence with which to establish his guilt."'1 Thus, applying the
McNabb-Mallory rule to the identification context, law enforcement
officials may not postpone the filing of formal charges until after
identification confrontations." 2 The McNabb-Mallory rule, which re-
quires a speedy arraignment, coupled with Kirby, which requires coun-
sel at postarraignment identifications, should in most cases guarantee an
At 8:00 p.m., a "steady interrogation" began. After an hour and a half, Mallory
confessed to rape, but was not taken to a United States Commissioner until the next
morning-after he had repeated his confession, dictated the confession to a typist, and
been confronted by the complaining witness. 354 U.S. at 450-51.
108. E.g., United States v. Broadhead, 413 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1969); Adams v.
United States, 399 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1067 (1969). But
see Williams v. United States, 419 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In addition, Mallory
involved a pre-arraignment confrontation. See note 107 supra.
109. Adams v. United States, 399 F.2d 574, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (concurring
opinion), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1067 (1969).
110. 354 U.S. at 455.
111. The Court in Mallory limited permissible delay to necessary police administra-
tive tasks, such as booking or the "quick verification" of exculpatory statements made
by the accused. Id. at 454-55.
112. Application of the McNabb-Mallory rule will not extend the right to counsel to
on-the-scene identification confrontations, which, even prior to Kirby, were exempted as
exigent circumstances. See note 45 supra.
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accused the right to counsel at postarrest identification proceedings."'
V. CONCLUSION
The Kirby decision has had a great impact upon the right to counsel
at corporeal identification proceedings." 4 Because of the ease with which
113. See Grano 742-55. Professor Grano advanced the Betts due process analysis-
viewing the circumstances of each case to determine if the presence of counsel in that
case was a fundamental right-as an additional constitutional basis for the right to
counsel under Kirby. He recommended a five-step analysis of identification procedures:
1. Is the identification procedure prohibited by a prophylactic due process
rule?
2. If the identification procedure is not prohibited, does the sixth amendment
right to counsel apply? (Kirby's limitation would be accepted).
3. If the sixth amendment does not apply, does due process require the assist-
ance of counsel?
4. Did a violation of a prompt-arraignment statute or rule preclude the defend-
ant from having counsel's assistance at the identification procedure?
5. Did the identification procedure result in a violation of the Stovall-Simmons
rule [prohibiting unnecessarily suggestive identification confrontations]?
114. Subsequent to Kirby, the Supreme Court held the right to counsel inapplicable to
any photographic identification proceeding. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
Prior to Ash, the United States Courts of Appeals had unanimously rejected the
application of the sixth amendment to photographic identifications. United States ex rel.
Reed v. Anderson, 461 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Long, 449 F.2d 288
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 974 (1971); United States v. Serio, 440 F.2d 827 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 838 (1971); United States v. Fowler, 439 F.2d 133 (9th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Williams, 436 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 912 (1971); United States v. Von Roeder, 435 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 934 (1971); United States v. Roustio, 435 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Edwards, 433 F.2d 357 (9th Cir. 1970); Allen v. Rhay, 431 F.2d 1160
(9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 834 (1971); United States v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d
1305 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Ballard, 423 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Collins, 416 F.2d 696 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1025 (1970); Rech v.
United States, 410 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 970 (1969); United
States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 852 (1969); United
States v. Robinson, 406 F.2d 64 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 926 (1969); McGee v.
United States, 402 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969).
Prior to Ash, the majority of state courts similarly denied the right to counsel at
photographic identifications. People v. Lawrence, 4 Cal. 3d 273, 481 P.2d 212, 93
Cal. Rptr. 204 (1971); Reed v. State, 281 A.2d 142 (Del. 1971); Staten v. State, 248
So. 2d 697 (Fla. App. 1971); People v. Martin, 47 Ill. 2d 331, 265 N.E.2d 685 (1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 921 (1971); Crenshaw v. State, 13 Md. App. 361, 283 A.2d 423
(1971); Smith v. State, 6 Md. App. 59, 250 A.2d 285 (1969); Stevenson v. State, 244 So.
2d 30 (Miss. 1971); State v. Brookins, 468 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. 1971); State v. Accor, 277
N.C. 65, 175 S.E.2d 583 (1970); State v. Searcy, 4 Wash. App. 860, 484 P.2d 417
(1971); Kain v. State, 48 Wis. 2d 212, 179 N.W.2d 777 (1970). But see Thompson v.
State, 85 Nev. 134, 451 P.2d 704, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 873 (1969); Commonwealth v.
Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 738, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 919 (1970). With Ash
having clearly resolved that no right to counsel exists at the federal level, the states are
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law enforcement officials can circumvent the limited protection remain-
ing under the Wade rule," 5 it appears that the right to counsel at many
federal identification confrontations is dead. With the majority of state
courts currently following Kirby, the same fate seems likely at the state
level. The state courts, however, do have alternatives. They can apply
the McNabb-Mallory rule, broadly interpret the language of Kirby, or
reject that decision outright. Through judicial declarations of state con-
stitutional law, promulgation of a curative rule of state criminal proce-
dure," -6 or adoption of broad statutory provisions, 1 7 the states can pre-
serve the right to counsel at corporeal identification proceedings.
likely to reaffirm that holding. See People v. Lowe, - Colo. -, 519 P.2d 344 (1974);
People v. Moreno, 181 Colo. 106, 507 P.2d 857 (1973); Morrison v. State, 129 Ga. App.
558, 200 S.E.2d 286 (1973); Parsley v. State, - Ind. -, 300 N.E.2d 652 (1973); Saw-
yer v. State, - Ind. -, 298 N.E.2d 440 (1973); State v. Wallace, - La. -, 285 So. 2d
796 (1973); State v. Higginbotham, 298 Minn. 1, 212 N.W.2d 881 (1973); State v. Hu-
erta, 191 Neb. 280, 214 N.W.2d 613 (1974); Green v. State, 510 S.W.2d 919 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1974); Hubgard v. State, 496 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); White
v. State, 496 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Holmes v. State, 59 Wis. 2d 488,
208 N.W.2d 815 (1973).
In an extraordinarily well-reasoned and thoroughly researched pre-Ash opinion, the
Michigan Supreme Court held that the right to counsel does apply at all pretrial
photographic identification procedures. People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 205 N.W.2d
461 (1973). People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 217 N.W.2d 22 (1974), continued the
Michigan Supreme Court's policy as established in Anderson. Anderson, however, also
held that a suspect who is in custody must be identified in a corporeal identification
procedure rather than a photographic lineup.
115. See note 72 supra.
116. The adoption of rules of procedure avoids problems of retroactivity and pre-
serves a flexibility lacking in constitutional law. Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa.
167, -, 320 A.2d 351, 357 (1974) (Pomeroy, J., concurring).
117. Cf. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-451(b) (2) (1969). The statute was extended after
Wade to establish a broad postarrest right to counsel. State v. Bass, 280 N.C. 435, 186
S.E.2d 384 (1972). After Kirby, the statute was amended to require appointment of
counsel at a corporeal identification proceeding only "after formal charges have been
preferred." N.C. Gen. St. § 7A-451 (b) (2) (Supp. 1975).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss2/5
